Hi Professor, in the last section you began discussing moral absolutes and your skepticism about the presence of absolute moral duties. To illustrate, you pointed out that while promissory morality dictates that I should ordinarily keep my promise to pick my friend up, such a duty is overtopped by my duty to help someone in dire need.
If we assume that the promissory duty I owe to my friend was not absolute, in the sense that it can be defeated simply by the presence of another competing duty of higher stringency, then when I am inevitably late to pick him up from the airport, I do not owe him any corrective duties for my tardiness. That is, I will not need to apologise and/or explain my lateness, I can simply pick him up late and pretend that I did not breach my duty to pick him up at a previously agreed-upon time.
Indeed, on this view, we can say that, in presence of a more stringent duty, the duty to keep my promise to my friend has simply vanished. But surely that isn’t the case. Surely, I cannot be nonchalant about my lateness despite my inability to comply with my initial duty. Surely, I owe my friend secondary, corrective duties in lieu of my breach of my primary duties, even if said breach was justified. To be sure, the fact that my duties are absolute even though their fulfilment is impossible has corollaries in everyday experience. Before the advent of DNA testing, a judge, who was free from bias, sentenced on the strength of the available evidence Person A to prison. With the advent of DNA evidence, Person A is exonerated as his DNA did not match the criminal’s DNA left at the scene of the crime. Now, on the strength of the evidence, the judge had performed his duties impeccably. He could not possibly have known that A was innocent since all the evidence pointed to A. Further, it was impossible, given the lack of technological advancement when the case was decided, for the judge to have known that A was innocent. If the judiciary’s duty to ensure that only actually guilty individuals are punished were not absolute, then A would not be able to claim damages for his wrongful conviction. But it is precisely because judges are under such an absolute duty that the wrongfully convicted can be compensated for their wrongful convictions.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment. You make a good point. Whether it supports the existence of absolute duties, however, depends on what one means by "absolute." In the context of libertarianism, I take the claim that certain rights are absolute to mean that it is always wrong to violate those rights. Your objection seems to be based on a different understanding of absolutism, one in which a right's being absolute means that it cannot be "defeated." To be "defeated," in turn, seems to mean for you that the moral force of the right is altogether eliminated, leaving no kind of "residue" that could give rise to claims for compensation or even an apology.
I'm happy to admit that there are certain rights that are absolute in your sense. But a right can be absolute in your sense without being absolute in the sense I intended. That is, it might be that rights to property are "absolute" in the sense of always having some moral force, while it is nevertheless true that there are some cases in which the right thing to do, all-things-considered, is to violate that right.
Yes, I don’t disagree that there might be circumstances where one is compelled to breach certain duties one has. The example you listed being one. However, I think the point I was trying to make is that regardless of whether or not one has reason to breach a pre-existing duty, said breach is always a moral wrong. That is, our moral duties are never entirely “defeated” even in the face of competing duties of higher stringency, they are merely extenuated. This explains why we intuitively feel a compulsion to do the next best thing when we breach our duties. Were it not the case that the breach of a prior duty (no matter how justified) is always a moral wrong, then we would have no reason—in morality—to make amends (our secondary duties to attempt to correct or right the wrong).
Recalling the example of picking up my friend at the airport, I agree that I am fully justified in being late because I had to save someone who had been run over by traffic. However, the fact that I am justified in breaching my duty to my friend does not make that breach any less of a breach. Qua breach of a moral duty, it is a wrong that stands in need of correction. In this case, my secondary corrective duties would probably be satisfied if I apologised and explained why I failed to pick him up at the agreed-upon time (though, of course, there is still a “rational remainder”, since I can’t fully make up for my initial promise. We can’t, after all, make up for lost time). Were this not the case, and were it instead the case that the force of my duty of easy rescue completely outweighed the force of my promissory duty owed to my friend such that I did not commit a moral wrong, then I would owe no secondary duties of correction to my friend for my breach. I could simply arrive late and be nonchalant about my tardiness. And should my friend be upset with me about my tardiness I could warrantedly take umbrage at his questioning of my attitude since I have not committed a wrong. On this view, it is completely my choice whether I choose to apologise and explain my lateness to my friend. I am not compelled to do so since I have not committed a moral wrong. By contrast, on my view, I am compelled to do so as the force of my primary duty to keep my promise is merely extenuated and thus its breach is still a wrong which stands in need of correction.
To sum up, in my view, the stringency of the conflicting duty merely serves to extenuate the primary duty and reduces the severity or burdensomeness of one’s secondary duties of correction. So yes, I think this understanding of duties does roughly correspond with the libertarian understanding of “absolute” duties. Though my understanding probably consists of a broader range of duties whose breach I view as always wrong. The libertarian understanding would probably be limited to the set you listed.
Hi Professor, in the last section you began discussing moral absolutes and your skepticism about the presence of absolute moral duties. To illustrate, you pointed out that while promissory morality dictates that I should ordinarily keep my promise to pick my friend up, such a duty is overtopped by my duty to help someone in dire need.
If we assume that the promissory duty I owe to my friend was not absolute, in the sense that it can be defeated simply by the presence of another competing duty of higher stringency, then when I am inevitably late to pick him up from the airport, I do not owe him any corrective duties for my tardiness. That is, I will not need to apologise and/or explain my lateness, I can simply pick him up late and pretend that I did not breach my duty to pick him up at a previously agreed-upon time.
Indeed, on this view, we can say that, in presence of a more stringent duty, the duty to keep my promise to my friend has simply vanished. But surely that isn’t the case. Surely, I cannot be nonchalant about my lateness despite my inability to comply with my initial duty. Surely, I owe my friend secondary, corrective duties in lieu of my breach of my primary duties, even if said breach was justified. To be sure, the fact that my duties are absolute even though their fulfilment is impossible has corollaries in everyday experience. Before the advent of DNA testing, a judge, who was free from bias, sentenced on the strength of the available evidence Person A to prison. With the advent of DNA evidence, Person A is exonerated as his DNA did not match the criminal’s DNA left at the scene of the crime. Now, on the strength of the evidence, the judge had performed his duties impeccably. He could not possibly have known that A was innocent since all the evidence pointed to A. Further, it was impossible, given the lack of technological advancement when the case was decided, for the judge to have known that A was innocent. If the judiciary’s duty to ensure that only actually guilty individuals are punished were not absolute, then A would not be able to claim damages for his wrongful conviction. But it is precisely because judges are under such an absolute duty that the wrongfully convicted can be compensated for their wrongful convictions.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment. You make a good point. Whether it supports the existence of absolute duties, however, depends on what one means by "absolute." In the context of libertarianism, I take the claim that certain rights are absolute to mean that it is always wrong to violate those rights. Your objection seems to be based on a different understanding of absolutism, one in which a right's being absolute means that it cannot be "defeated." To be "defeated," in turn, seems to mean for you that the moral force of the right is altogether eliminated, leaving no kind of "residue" that could give rise to claims for compensation or even an apology.
I'm happy to admit that there are certain rights that are absolute in your sense. But a right can be absolute in your sense without being absolute in the sense I intended. That is, it might be that rights to property are "absolute" in the sense of always having some moral force, while it is nevertheless true that there are some cases in which the right thing to do, all-things-considered, is to violate that right.
What do you think?
Hi Professor,
Yes, I don’t disagree that there might be circumstances where one is compelled to breach certain duties one has. The example you listed being one. However, I think the point I was trying to make is that regardless of whether or not one has reason to breach a pre-existing duty, said breach is always a moral wrong. That is, our moral duties are never entirely “defeated” even in the face of competing duties of higher stringency, they are merely extenuated. This explains why we intuitively feel a compulsion to do the next best thing when we breach our duties. Were it not the case that the breach of a prior duty (no matter how justified) is always a moral wrong, then we would have no reason—in morality—to make amends (our secondary duties to attempt to correct or right the wrong).
Recalling the example of picking up my friend at the airport, I agree that I am fully justified in being late because I had to save someone who had been run over by traffic. However, the fact that I am justified in breaching my duty to my friend does not make that breach any less of a breach. Qua breach of a moral duty, it is a wrong that stands in need of correction. In this case, my secondary corrective duties would probably be satisfied if I apologised and explained why I failed to pick him up at the agreed-upon time (though, of course, there is still a “rational remainder”, since I can’t fully make up for my initial promise. We can’t, after all, make up for lost time). Were this not the case, and were it instead the case that the force of my duty of easy rescue completely outweighed the force of my promissory duty owed to my friend such that I did not commit a moral wrong, then I would owe no secondary duties of correction to my friend for my breach. I could simply arrive late and be nonchalant about my tardiness. And should my friend be upset with me about my tardiness I could warrantedly take umbrage at his questioning of my attitude since I have not committed a wrong. On this view, it is completely my choice whether I choose to apologise and explain my lateness to my friend. I am not compelled to do so since I have not committed a moral wrong. By contrast, on my view, I am compelled to do so as the force of my primary duty to keep my promise is merely extenuated and thus its breach is still a wrong which stands in need of correction.
To sum up, in my view, the stringency of the conflicting duty merely serves to extenuate the primary duty and reduces the severity or burdensomeness of one’s secondary duties of correction. So yes, I think this understanding of duties does roughly correspond with the libertarian understanding of “absolute” duties. Though my understanding probably consists of a broader range of duties whose breach I view as always wrong. The libertarian understanding would probably be limited to the set you listed.